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Trends in Communist Propaganda

29 May 75

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

29 MAY 1975
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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PRC CAREFULLY BALANCES U.S. PORTRAYAL AFTER INDOCHINA EVENTS

Recent Chinese comment on the U.S. "defeat" in Indochina has carefully distinguished between U.S. "weakness" in opposing popular struggle abroad and the U.S. strength vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Some Peking comment beamed to Taiwan has gone so far as to defend Washington against Taipei press charges that the recent Indochina events have demonstrated that the United States has become less resolute in support of its allies.

NCNA ON MAYAGUEZ A 21 May NCNA correspondent's article on the Mayaguez ship seizure was consistent with Peking's recent approach, tempering its anti-U.S. attack by presenting the U.S. military action as an aberration caused by a "political need" to shore up the U.S. international position after the Indochina defeat and by also attacking the USSR over the incident. The NCNA article claimed that the United States had played up the Mayaguez incident as "a typical farce of self-consolation" in response to communist victories in Indochina. The article stated that instead of boosting national morale and improving its international image, the United States had further damaged both, asserting more bluntly than usual that the Mayaguez affair had "given the paper tiger more signs of wear and tear."

The sharp NCNA critique did not refer to the Ford Administration explicitly--a Chinese practice consistent with Peking's two previous, more authoritative commentaries on the incident in brief remarks by PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien on 15 May and a 17 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article.* The NCNA article

* Criticism of the "Ford-Kissinger clique" was included, however, in an NCNA report on an 18 May message by Peking's close ally, Cambodian Prince Sihanouk, who similarly castigated the U.S. reaction to the Mayaguez incident as "ridiculous bragging" and a futile effort to improve the U.S. image. Peking's own earlier response to the incident is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 May 1975, pages 8-9.

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also took a sharp jab at the USSR, devoting its middle paragraph to attacking "apologists from Moscow" allegedly trying to "whitewash" U.S. actions.

The NCNA assessment is consistent with recent Chinese comment on the U.S. "defeat" in Indochina, including most recently several commentaries pegged to the fifth anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 statement, a major polemic issued to condemn the U.S. incursion into Cambodia. Peking has depicted the United States as inevitably defeated by the "people's" resistance, but has acknowledged the major world role still played by the United States. Thus, a 20 May NCNA review of the U.S. "defeat" carefully underlined that the United States "as an imperialist superpower" remains "militarily and economically powerful."

TREATMENT OF U.S.
WORLD ROLE

Other recent Chinese comment has depicted the U.S. role in world affairs as undiminished in the wake of the communist victories in Indochina. Peking has consistently reported favorably on remarks by high-level U.S. officials testifying to continuing U.S. resolve vis-a-vis the USSR, noting most recently in a 21 May NCNA report on the Kissinger-Gromyko Vienna meeting that Kissinger had reportedly warned the USSR "not to try to exploit what it might consider American weaknesses" following the Indochina collapse. The report also recalled President Ford's 10 April speech warning the USSR not to "fish in troubled waters," and Kissinger's admonition on 12 May that the United States was determined to resist "pressures or the exploitation of local conflict." Moreover, Peking recently stressed an unusual point in a 21 May NCNA commentary, noting that the continuing U.S. economic recession has had no effect on what it described as the continuing rapid growth of U.S. "war industries" for use against the USSR.

NCNA reportage has continued to play up U.S. and foreign views that the U.S. involvement in Indochina was a strategic error, and that withdrawal provides an opportunity to strengthen Washington's overall strategic position abroad. For instance, a 21 May NCNA report on a press interview given by French President Giscard highlighted his remark that the end of the U.S. Indochina involvement could give Washington "more freedom to weigh things and to take action in other fields of foreign policy." A 25 May NCNA review of Indochina post-mortems in the U.S. press similarly played up the view that the U.S. disengagement has stood the United States in "good stead," since it allows Washington to pull back from where it had "overstretched itself" and "to focus its chief attention and forces on areas vital to U.S. interests" vis-a-vis Moscow.

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TAIWAN A few recent signed articles carried by PRC radio broadcasts beamed to Taiwan have linked the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina with the sensitive issue of continuing U.S. support for Taiwan.* The articles have played up U.S. determination to maintain its international commitments, even to "reactionary" allies abroad, while they have warned Taipei that the "lessons" of Indochina show that foreign support is not sufficient to safeguard a regime in the face of popular resistance. Peking has repeatedly emphasized the vast quantities of manpower and resources that the United States expended in Indochina, and has even gone so far as to defend the United States from Taipei press charges that Washington was less than firm in supporting its Indochina allies.

For example, a 19 May Fukien Front radio broadcast to Taiwan criticized Taipei for believing that the United States "should assume every risk and even should have no scruples about unleashing World War III" in defending its "lackeys." A 25 May broadcast admitted that toward the end, U.S. assistance to its "puppet regimes" in Indochina was "not as vigorous as before" but stated that it was "absurd" to look upon this as determining the outcome of the war. The broadcast recalled U.S. support to the Kuomintang during the Chinese civil war, the direct U.S. role in Korea, and the "huge" U.S. commitment in Indochina in order to denigrate the idea that the United States fails to live up to its commitments. The broadcast also advised that it was useless to hold a "grudge against a foreign master," and noted that the PRC did not believe in holding grudges and would welcome Taiwan "patriots" back into the fold.

* This issue was also discussed in the TRENDS of 14 May 1975, page 24.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW SHARPLY ATTACKS PEKING DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

Recent Soviet comment has sharply attacked Chinese diplomatic efforts seeking closer relations with Europe as part of a developing Chinese strategy aimed at torpedoing Moscow's own European goals and heightening East-West tensions. Moscow's criticism has focused on PRC Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's 12-17 May visit to France and Peking's recent agreement to establish formal ties with the European Community, during the 4-11 May visit to Peking by an EC delegation.* The Soviet comment, which has included signed articles in PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, is notably harsher than Moscow's low-key response two years ago to the September 1973 official Peking visit by French President Pompidou, the first West European head of state to visit China. The harsh tone seems to reflect increased Soviet concern that the recent uneven progress in East-West relations provides a more fertile field for China's efforts at a time when Moscow's prestige is increasingly committed to the success of European detente.

Moscow comment has centered on the theme that Peking's increased visibility in Europe is designed to build up East-West tension and that its support for West European unity and NATO military strength is aimed at undermining current talks to strengthen European security. For example, authoritative commentator Yuriy Zhukov said in PRAVDA on the 20th that the Chinese "firebrands" ultimately want to set the East-West European military blocs against each other so that China can "repeat the old myth of the monkey-king" and sit on the mountain gleefully observing the two "tigers" he has incited fight each other.

The current Soviet charges over Teng's trip contrast with Moscow's reaction to the Pompidou visit, when it voiced confidence that West European leaders would not be taken in by Peking's anti-Soviet designs. Moscow media at that time played up the French President's blunt statements--at a press conference in Peking and in the formal joint communique marking the visit--differing with Peking on detente and voicing determination to pursue closer relations with Moscow.

* The visit to France by Teng Hsiao-ping, the highest-level Chinese official to visit a West European state, and the establishment of PRC-EC ties is discussed in the TRENDS of 14 May 1975, pages 22-23.

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During Teng Hsiao-ping's visit to Paris, French President Giscard was more circumspect in assessing Sino-French differences and there was no joint communique, forcing Moscow media to exploit remarks by lower-level officials and French press comment testifying to the continued Paris commitment to detente. An 18 May TASS commentary by Anatoliy Krasikov showed unusual concern over French Prime Minister Chirac's reported statement that the two sides had reached a "coincidence of views" on a wide range of issues during Teng's visit. It endeavored to offset this image of Sino-French solidarity by playing up comment from Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues and in the French press that Peking's anti-detente approach did not enjoy wide appeal among the French and that relations with Moscow remained a foundation stone of French foreign policy.

The present Soviet attacks are reminiscent of the sharp Soviet response to reports last fall that Chinese leaders, in discussions with FRG leaders, were encouraging the revival of a unified Germany in order to upset Soviet European policy. A 19 October Yuriy Zhukov commentary in PRAVDA had similarly focused on Teng Hsiao-ping as a leader of the Peking "firebrands" who wish to "warm their hands over the thermonuclear fire after causing a clash between socialist and capitalist countries."*

* The Moscow reaction is discussed in the TRENDS of 23 October 1974, page 12.

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MIDDLE EAST

USSR DERIDES REPORTS OF BASES IN LIBYA, AMBIGUOUS ON ARMS

Moscow promptly dismissed recent reports, first published in the Egyptian press and replayed by Western media, that Kosygin's 12-15 May visit to Libya produced a major military agreement which would provide the USSR with air, ground, and sea bases in Libya in exchange for large quantities of modern weapons. The Soviet rebuttals--limited thus far to Moscow radio Arabic and English broadcasts on the 23d and a brief PRAVDA article carried textually by TASS on the 27th--focused on the matter of Soviet "bases" and left ambiguous other aspects of a secret Soviet-Libyan military accord.

During Kosygin's visit, there had been indications in the media of both countries that issues of military cooperation were discussed, but no evidence that a military agreement was reached. Moscow's reaction to the current reports is in line with past Soviet treatment of claims that the USSR had sought or obtained base rights in such countries as Somalia, Iraq, and South Yemen.

CAIRO'S CHARGES Egyptian press accounts of a new Soviet-Libyan military accord--reinforced by remarks by President as-Sadat himself--may have been designed to convey Cairo's displeasure over Moscow's continued refusal to send Egypt new weapons. Thus as-Sadat, in a statement to the Los Angeles TIMES reported by Cairo radio on 29 May--a week after the initial Cairo press report--declared that the USSR and Libya had concluded in secret "the largest arms deal in the history of the Middle East." He said the USSR would deliver 12 billion dollars' worth of "the most sophisticated weapons imaginable, including the most advanced tanks and aircraft which the Soviet Union has not given to Egypt or Syria." As-Sadat claimed that the agreement would give the USSR a presence on the southern Mediterranean for 50 years and that Soviet experts would remain in Libya for 25 years to provide military training.

In the first Egyptian report, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) cited AL-AHRAM's Beirut correspondent as saying on the 23d that the USSR and Libya had signed a military agreement during Kosygin's visit. The article claimed that the terms of the agreement included delivery of four billion dollars' worth of Soviet military equipment--"thousands of tanks and rockets"--which it referred to as sophisticated weapons not being presently supplied to the Arab

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"confrontation states." AL-AHRAM added that Libya, in return, granted the USSR the right to air, ground, and naval bases on Libyan territory and would accept Soviet experts "on all military aspects and on all levels." The paper explained that Kosygin had convinced President al-Qadhafi that the lack of Libyan military personnel qualified to use the new sophisticated weapons would necessitate the presence of Soviet advisers.

Other Egyptian accounts have varied in details but have agreed that Libya granted the USSR military base rights and indicated it would accept contingents of Soviet military advisers in exchange for large deliveries of modern Soviet weapons. On the 23d MENA noted that the original AL-AHRAM article had been widely reported, and added that another AL-AHRAM report from Beirut carried confirmation from a Soviet source that the USSR and Libya had signed a military agreement under which Moscow would provide "tanks, planes, and missiles," although the source refused to comment on whether Soviet experts would be sent to operate the radar system, set up the missile sites, and prepare Libyan ports to accommodate Soviet ships. Cairo's weekly AKHBAR AL-YAWM claimed that the secret Soviet-Libyan military agreement was valued at 12 billion dollars, explained that Libya could not absorb modern weapons and therefore had "agreed to thousands of Russian experts," and predicted that Tobruk would become a Soviet base. AKHBAR AL-YAWM's chief editor, Mustafa Amin, stressed the theme that although "arming of any Arab state is arming of all," Libya could lose its independence by attempting to function as an "arsenal for the Arabs" (a phrase which Libya has used for itself). Recalling Cairo's experience, Amin said that "Egypt was not able to fight in October, except after as-Sadat expelled the Russian experts from the Egyptian army."

SOVIET REBUTTALS Moscow promptly denounced the original AL-AHRAM article, focusing on the allegation that the USSR had obtained a right to military bases in Libya. A Moscow radio commentary in Arabic by A.Zlatorunskiy on the 23d, titled "In Keeping with Western Reactionary Newspapers," described the article as an attempt to tarnish the results of Kosygin's Mideast visit and Soviet-Arab relations generally. Zlatorunskiy charged that AL-AHRAM had added its voice to those of the "most reactionary imperialist circles" in alleging that the USSR was trying to obtain foreign military bases, and he referred his listeners to the joint communiques issued after Kosygin's visits to Libya and to Tunisia (15-17 May), asserting that the documents demonstrated that the USSR continues to advocate the liquidation of foreign military bases

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and the transformation of the Mediterranean into a "zone of peace and international cooperation." Additionally, a Moscow English-language broadcast to Great Britain and Ireland on the 23d cited a Libyan embassy spokesman in Cairo as denying reports that the USSR had been granted the right to establish military bases in Libya, noting that the reports had originated with the Cairo press.

After several days' silence, a PRAVDA article on the 27th continued the general line of Moscow's rebuttal but in sharper language. The article, as carried by TASS, accused AL-AHRAM of publishing a "crude fabrication" and of following the "vicious path" of "reactionary Western propaganda" in using lies to distort Soviet Mideast policy and discredit Soviet-Arab friendship. PRAVDA did not deny that some type of military agreement had been reached, however, while specifically labeling as false the assertion that Libya would receive Soviet arms worth 12 billion dollars. And it derided AL-AHRAM's report of a Soviet-Libyan agreement granting the USSR naval and air bases on Libyan territory, calling this a product of the paper's imagination.

PAST DENIALS In the past Moscow has generally responded to press reports that it had sought or obtained foreign bases by replaying denials of local officials and media in the area concerned. Typifying this approach, TASS on 5 September 1974 replayed denials by the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, the Somali embassy in France, and a South Yemeni Government spokesman of a U.S. Defense Department statement that the USSR had bases in Somalia, Iraq, and South Yemen. Soviet media reacted similarly to reports of Soviet attempts to obtain bases in Peru in October 1974 and in Portugal in February 1975.

Occasionally Soviet media have also directly dismissed such reports, often including countercharges against existing or planned U.S. foreign bases. This was the case in winter 1974, for example, during a flurry of comment on the issue of U.S. plans to expand air and naval facilities on Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean. Similarly, in late summer 1974, President Ford's 28 August press conference remarks on the Diego Garcia base issue--which included his statement that the USSR had three Indian Ocean bases--evoked an expression of Soviet regret over the President's "inaccuracy" and an assertion by a TASS commentator that there was not a single Soviet naval base in the Indian Ocean.*

* For details on examples related to the Diego Garcia issue, see the TRENDS of 5 September 1974, pages 5-6, and 21 February 1974, page 19.

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Only rarely has Moscow issued an official denial or formal protest against reports of Soviet foreign bases. One such occasion was a 15 November 1968 TASS announcement that "TASS has been instructed to emphatically refute as an absolutely groundless concoction the allegations circulated in the Western press about the creation of a Soviet naval base in Mers-El-Kebir and a network of Soviet rocket installations in Algeria." On one other previous occasion, in October 1966, TASS and IZVESTIYA carried a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement denying a London DAILY MIRROR story that the USSR had pressured Egypt to grant it naval bases.

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USSR - PORTUGAL

MOSCOW RESTRAINED ON CURRENT SITUATION, VIEWS DETENTE

Moscow has been unusually ambivalent, lowkeyed and dilatory in its handling of recent developments in Portugal--the intensified political struggle between the Socialist Party (PS) and the Communist Party (PCP) on the one hand, and between the political parties and the Armed Forces Movement on the other. This may be a reflection of Moscow's caution and uncertainty over such questions as the future role of Portuguese political parties, particularly the PCP; the possibility that the Movement may establish a "new-type" public organization to bypass the established parties; and the general direction the Movement leadership will take at a time of considerable political and economic chaos. The thrust of Soviet reportage and comment has been to identify the PCP with the Movement as closely as possible and to underline the need for the PCP to remain united with the Movement. There have also been some reiterations of previous calls for unity of the "progressive forces." Moscow has also discussed the effect of Portuguese developments on detente, asserting routinely that there is no connection between the two.

RECENT EVENTS Soviet media have been slow to react to such major events as the May Day confrontation between the Socialists and Communists and the 18-19 May closing of the Socialist daily REPUBLICA. In contrast--and in line with its past public stress on the necessity for PCP-PS cooperation--Moscow was quick to endorse the "positive" 5 May meeting between PS leader Soares and PCP leader Cunhal to work out some form of cooperation agreement between the two parties. Notably, Moscow has not replayed many of the harshest criticisms directed at the Socialists and Soares personally by Cunhal and the PCP leadership and, similarly, has not repeated Cunhal's 18 May warning to the Movement that "democracy and socialism cannot be built without the PCP, much less against the PCP."

Moscow did publicly, albeit belatedly, acknowledge the severity of the present situation, in a TASS dispatch from Lisbon on the 23d and in the first meaningful comment to appear in the central press since the elections, an E. Kovalev dispatch in PRAVDA on the 28th.* TASS cited without comment a PCP statement as saying

* See the TRENDS of 30 April 1975, pages 24-25, for a discussion of Moscow's comment immediately following the April elections.

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that the present actions of the Socialists could lead to a situation where "it is no longer possible to maintain a coalition government and the whole of the current system of power." It further reported the statement to the effect that if the PS "ruins by its own hand the government coalition system, there is no sense in the very existence of the constituent assembly." (Cunhal, in a PRAVDA interview on the 14th, had typically downgraded the significance given to the elections and formation of the constituent assembly by Soares. It is unclear from the Cunhal and PCP statements whether the PCP wants to see the Movement dissolve the scheduled constituent assembly as another step in the process of the "revolution.")

The Kovalev article clearly placed the blame on the PS for the present crisis, attributing this charge to an article in the daily O SECULO. Kovalev concluded, however, with an appeal for unity: "The country's progressive forces are now faced with the task of doing everything to prevent a split and to insure Portugal's development along the path chosen by the people of the country."

The threat to political parties if unity is ignored was underscored by PRAVDA's treatment of a passage from the Movement's General Assembly 26 May communique. Kovalev noted that the communique said a working group would be formed to examine the possibility of establishing direct links between the Movement and the people, in effect bypassing the parties. However, Kovalev did not mention the communique's conciliatory avowal that the proposal was "not intended to isolate the mass organizations" in the country, that is, the political parties. Thus Moscow appeared to be sharpening the Armed Forces Movement's warning to the parties.

PORTUGAL AND DETENTE Moscow commentators have only rarely directly broached Western speculation about the apparent trend of ever-increasing PCP influence over the Movement, about assertions that Moscow is secretly supporting and guiding the PCP, and about the ultimate consequences these developments will have on detente in general and on U.S.-Soviet relations specifically. Soviet observers have repeated statements by Movement leaders that Lisbon will maintain and fulfill its international commitments such as its NATO obligations, and they have leveled criticism, particularly before the April elections, at Western press calls for linking the Portugal problem to the question of European detente. PRAVDA's Lisbon correspondent V. Yermakov, for example, on 20 April strongly refuted allegations

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that the USSR was interfering in Portuguese affairs and trying "to influence any of its political parties." Yermakov also criticized LE MONDE for making "the most improbable fabrications," such as linking Portugal to the Vladivostok summit "where, the newspaper maintains, the USSR recognized that 'Portugal is in the Western sphere of influence.'" And he took issue with a FINANCIAL TIMES "canard" which allegedly said that the USSR was taking a "cautious" approach toward Portugal.

Moscow radio's U.S. specialist Valentin Zorin, in a Bratislava radio interview on 3 May, was more direct than Yermakov. Comparing Portugal with Vietnam, Zorin asserted that the Portuguese events were the result "of internal developments" in that country. Pointing out that Portugal had "no relationship to the policy of detente," Zorin declared that "nothing that could endanger the policy of detente is going on in Portugal; rather, it is a process of democratization."

In a passage that could be designed both as an anodyne for Western fears and a cautionary note to the PCP, Zorin said: "There are no reasons to say that Portugal is facing a communist takeover because there simply are no conditions for this. Marxists have always been against exporting revolutions. In my view, a takeover of power by communists in Portugal is a matter of the distant future--and even then it will be the result of internal developments. The recent elections confirmed this."

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VIETNAM

SAIGON RADIO ACKNOWLEDGES PROBLEMS FACING NEW ADMINISTRATION

Nearly a month after the communist capture of Saigon and the establishment of the Military Management Committee, Vietnamese communist media still have not set forth a policy on the formation of a national government in South Vietnam or any timetable for the complete unification of North and South. Propaganda has focused on the installation of low-level administrative organizations in the South and has acknowledged major problems facing the new authorities, including the need to impose order and security, to provide food and other essentials for the populace, and to "eliminate" opponents of the new order and manifestations of the former culture. Comment has encouraged refugees to return from urban areas to their native villages and has continued to maintain that refugees who left the country were "forced" to do so by the United States. The communists have rejected the U.S. suggestion that they have obstructed the repatriation of those evacuees who would like to return, citing a 23 May statement by a UN spokesman that the PRG is cooperative and would welcome the return of the refugees.

Saigon radio has been providing detailed guidance on policies to meet the problems faced in the conquered areas of South Vietnam and, in doing so, has been more candid than Hanoi or Liberation Radio in acknowledging the nature and extent of the problems. Thus, for example, a Saigon broadcast on 23 May reported that citizens had been aiding agencies of the "revolutionary administration" to identify prostitutes and drug addicts, and it cited an instance when citizens had assisted in the capture of a thief. A feature in the Saigon paper GIAI PHONG* the following day, reported by the radio, applauded as "correct and imperative" the capture and summary punishment of "robbers and hooligans" caught in the act. The radio has not publicized reports on executions of criminals which Western newsmen have said were published in GIAI PHONG.

* Saigon radio on 5 May reported the appearance of the "first issue" of the Saigon GIAI PHONG, describing it as the "voice of the Saigon-Gia Dinh people." During the war the central organ of the National Liberation Front was similarly named GIAI PHONG (Liberation) and articles attributed to it were publicized by the Front radio and news agency.

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Saigon radio has also acknowledged that measures were being taken against opponents of the new authorities, although the communists continue to maintain that even former GVN officials and army officers will be treated leniently if they "repent" and cooperate. An editorial in GIAI PHONG on 23 May, reported by Saigon radio, stressed the offer of pardon to those who repent but also noted that a "minority" which has continued to "deliberately and stubbornly sabotage the revolution" will be "eliminated to the last." On the previous day the radio had reported that people's revolutionary committees at the basic level, in addition to helping employ and feed the people and restore order, were also "tracking down the hiding stubborn elements."

In addition to general reports on the establishment of people's revolutionary committees at local levels, the Saigon radio on 28 May outlined in some detail the structure of the low-level administrative organizations. The radio noted the formation of subcommittees in hamlets in charge of health, finance, and other specialized functions, and the creation of cells embracing 10 to 12 families to help implement policy and report to higher authorities. A commentary in GIAI PHONG on the same day, broadcast by the radio, described the present administration--in terms appropriate for a communist state--as a "people's democratic administration led by the proletariat" which is "exercising dictatorship" over "enemies," including "the stubborn vestiges of U.S. imperialism and its henchmen" and "hooligans." The commentary asserted that the administration "should be built on the basis of revolutionary people who are reorganized through the strength of mass groups," and noted the formation of mass organizations of workers, peasants, youth, and women.

Even while such comment in effect acknowledges the effort to establish a communist regime--or dictatorship of the proletariat--the media also reflect a pragmatic realization that there will not be an immediate transformation in the South. Thus, the Saigon radio on 25 May reported that representatives of the Liberation Trade Union Federation had met with "private property owners" to encourage the reopening of private businesses to provide jobs for workers. An editorial in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN on the 28th praised the new "equal relations" between workers and businessmen and noted that "the revolutionary government allows private production establishments of businessmen not related to imperialism and the reactionary administration to continue their operations."

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COMMUNIST RELATIONS

DPRK, ROMANIA STRESS INDEPENDENCE, UNITY DURING KIM VISIT

Kim Il-song's 22-26 May official visit to Romania was utilized by both Bucharest and Pyongyang to underscore their independent positions within the communist movement and to make joint efforts toward identifying their interests with those of the Third World. A "treaty of friendship and cooperation" concluded between the two parties at the conclusion of the visit emphasized national independence and equality among states and parties, in language which seemed aimed at Moscow. While Kim seemed to temper his rhetoric on a variety of subjects in deference to his hosts, he did not follow President Ceausescu's lead in recognizing increasing international detente.

The joint treaty codified a number of longstanding Romanian and Korean principles of interstate and interparty relations and also endorsed pet issues of each side. Thus, the treaty endorsed "national sovereignty and complete equality, noninterference in other's internal affairs," and called for strengthened relations with "all" socialist countries, communist parties and "progressive forces." It also approved DPRK efforts for "peaceful reunification" and withdrawal of "aggressive foreign troops" from South Korea, and Romania's repeated calls for disarmament and abolition of military alliances. The countries' defiant attitude toward Moscow was underlined by Kim at the signing ceremony, when he asserted that the treaty would never have been signed had not the two leaders "invariably maintained" their independence and refused to "act under any baton." Among the treaty provisions which the Soviets are likely to find objectionable was the demand that "foreign military bases in the territory of other countries must be completely dismantled and all foreign troops stationed in other countries be withdrawn."

The treaty affirmed Bucharest's and Pyongyang's affinity to the Third World in pointing out their "active support" for national liberation movements and their agreement to strengthen "unity and solidarity," not only among the socialist states but also among the developing and nonaligned states. Its pitch in this direction was underlined by a KCNA report on the signing which described the treaty as an "inspiration" not only for other socialist states but for the Third World as well. Ceausescu has been tireless in his efforts to achieve independent endorsements of Romania's foreign policies. In April, for example,

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he signed solemn declarations with the leaders of the Phillipines, Jordan and Tunisia and on 27 May signed a like declaration with Greece's Karamanlis.

The joint communique issued on the visit stated that the atmosphere of the talks between the two leaders demonstrated "warm comradely friendship, mutual esteem and understanding" and that "unanimity" was reached on all topics discussed. This indicates even more cordiality than during Ceausescu's visit to Pyongyang in 1971, when the communique referred to a "friendly, sincere and comradely" atmosphere without specifically referring to any meeting of the minds. The two leaders also referred to the "commonness" of their independent policies.

COMMUNIST RELATIONS Both countries carefully supported each other's communist credentials, noting in particular their "creative" application of the principles of Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of their respective countries. A recurrent theme in their speeches as well as the treaty and communique was the need for strong individual party autonomy in order to develop true communist unity. Unlike the 1971 joint communique, the Bucharest communique contained no reference to "difficulties" in the communist movement. Both Kim and Ceausescu referred to Romanian, though not Korean, efforts to develop communist unity.

Speaking at a 24 May rally, Kim noted that socialist countries may "differ in their views" but, as he has done for many years, he called for socialist unity on the basis of "opposing imperialism, supporting the . . . national liberation movement, continuing to advance towards socialism and communism, and adhering to the principles of nonintervention in domestic affairs, equality and reciprocity." Inexplicably, Kim dropped from this list his usual references to the need to support the "international working class" and the principle of "mutual respect." These two points were also missing from the principles for socialist unity both sides endorsed in the joint communique.

Kim's attention to the theme of independence during the visit was not unusual, but his comments, though still oblique, seemed to point more clearly than usual at the Soviet Union. In his speech on the 22d, Kim noted that "socialist countries . . . now refuse to follow blindly the big powers, but seek to act independently." Kim had previously made this claim of the socialist countries' independence from "big powers," along with insisting on the need for strict noninterference in internal

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affairs among socialist countries, in a June 1974 interview with a Peruvian newspaper, carried by KCNA in November. At the 24 May rally Kim noted that "all" communist and workers parties are "equal and independent," that "there are no higher or lower parties."

KOREAN UNITY

Kim's remarks on the Korean situation were substantively similar, though rhetorically more restrained than those he made during his visit to Peking in April.* At the banquet on the 22d, Kim pledged to "actively support and encourage" the "antifascist struggle" in South Korea, and failed to mention the North-South dialog. Probably in deference to his hosts, Kim avoided specific references to the U.S. presence in the South, speaking instead, of "outside forces" which are "encouraging . . . and tempting" the Seoul regime, thus aggravating tension and increasing the danger of war. Apparently also as a bow to the Romanians, Kim did not repeat the language he had used in Peking--which has been a standard Pyongyang theme since--that in any future conflict the North would meet force with force and gain the country's reunification. He observed instead that "attempts to do something by force lead nowhere, and it can never be lasting." Addressing the issue of U.S. troops in the South, Kim called on "those forces which hamper reunification" to withdraw all foreign troops wearing the emblems of the UN forces before it is too late.

In his remarks during the visit Ceausescu referred neither to the question of foreign troops in South Korea nor to the Seoul regime. In his rally speech on the 24th, Ceausescu offered support for the "constructive initiatives and correct policy" of the DPRK, but in referring to "peaceful reunification" of Korea he did not cite any specific Pyongyang proposal. In the communique, however, the Romanian side lent its support for Kim's five-point proposal of June 1973, opposed attempts by "imperialist forces and South Korean authorities" to create "two Koreas," and maintained that "all foreign troops wearing the emblem of the UN must withdraw from South Korea at an early date."

* Kim's remarks during his Peking visit were discussed in the TRENDS of 23 April, pages 19-23 and 30 April, pages 8-9.

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KIM ON ECONOMIC
RELATIONS

In his 22 May banquet speech Kim devoted notable attention to the question of international trade, observing that socialist countries "must develop economic relations" with capitalist countries. While pointing to the need for "consolidating and developing socialist markets," Kim indicated that "vigorous" trade outside such markets was also important, not only for developing a "diversified economy" and insuring national independence, but also to "contribute greatly to accelerate mutual understanding and promoting solidarity with many countries the world over and preserving and consolidating peace."

Kim's comments, well tuned to Romanian sensibilities, are also in line with--and even seem to go somewhat beyond--a 4 March Kim speech acknowledging the North's need to trade with capitalist countries, since trade confined to the socialist countries was no longer sufficient for the North's developing economy.* In that speech, Kim had argued that foreign trade provided an opportunity to enhance the DPRK's external standing and dignity, and to develop "favorable relations" with other countries, but he had not counted "consolidating peace" as one of its benefits. Stress on trade with capitalist countries contrasts with previous Pyongyang policy--enunciated by Kim in a major speech in December 1967 and referred to as late as December 1971--on the overwhelming importance of the socialist market, both for the economic development of the socialist countries and for driving the "capitalist market into an unstable position" and aggravating the "general crisis" of world capitalism.

* This speech is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 March 1975, pages 29-30.

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EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE

SOVIET BLOC-YUGOSLAV IMPASSE MOUNTS OVER DOCUMENT DRAFT

Indications are accumulating that preparations for the Soviet-sponsored conference of 28 East and West European communist parties, originally planned for mid-1975, are breaking down over the issue of the type of document to be adopted by the conference. The latest sign of this is an article by Polish party Politburo member and secretary Babiuch published in the Czechoslovak party daily RUDE PRAVO on 23 May. Obviously intended to express the position of the Moscow-oriented parties on the question of unity versus diversity among the European communist parties, the article declared that one of the objectives of the conference should be to adopt a joint "program." This, in effect, throws down the gauntlet to the independents, since they have resisted the adoption of such a binding document since it was first proposed by the host party, the GDR, and submitted to the preparatory working group in East Berlin in April.

The resultant impasse raises the prospect that Belgrade may boycott the planned all-European conference, as it had the European CP conference held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia in 1967. The current Yugoslav public stance has taken the form of assurances that it is continuing to take part in the conference preparations coupled with assertions that it will not compromise its nonaligned principles. Against this background, LCY Executive Committee member Grlickov visited Moscow on 14-17 May, followed by a visit to the fellow-maverick Romanians on 22-23 May. The Moscow domestic service on the 17th said only that Grlickov and CPSU secretaries Ponomarev and Katushev discussed the European CP conference preparations. Apparently to cover up a reported Yugoslav absence, Soviet bloc media did not report a conference working group session which, according to Western media, took place in East Berlin on the 12th without the Yugoslavs.

PROGRAM ISSUE The aforementioned Babiuch article, whose appearance in the Prague party daily was apparently intended to underscore Soviet bloc solidarity, took a tougher stance on the document issue than a 2 May ADN interview with the SED's Axen had done.* Thus Babiuch declared that the

* See the TRENDS of 7 May 1975, pages 17-19.

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communists and all working people of Europe "expect a comprehensive and compact program," adding that "we have all the necessary conditions to enable our movement, which proceeds from the principles of proletarian internationalism, to present such a program." He went on to invoke Polish party first secretary Gierek's statement at the opening of the first conference preparatory session in Warsaw in October that the European communist movement "is capable of outlining a program" for peace and social progress and that "all the European nations expect us to produce such a program." Babiuch was also more forthright than Axen had been in acknowledging interparty differences during the conference preparations, noting that "differing conditions of activity cannot but produce certain differing methods of approaching various problems." In a subdued assessment of the conference preparations, Babiuch said only that they had been, "we believe, most positive" and businesslike and were "now beginning" to yield results.

On the timing of the conference, Babiuch directly countered Western conjectures regarding a lengthy postponement by flatly predicting that the conclave would take place this year, "in the year of the 30th anniversary" of V-E Day. He did not directly link the timing with the anticipated summit-level windup of the European Security Conference (CSCE), but he did say that work on the peace program should go on while the windup of the CSCE is taking place.

YUGOSLAV POSITION Yugoslavia has maintained an ambiguous position on whether it will take part in the conference. The number-two figure in the LCY, Executive Committee Secretary Dolanc, declared in a 26 May statement on the anniversary of the 10th LCY congress that his party was "participating in the preparation of the conference of European communist parties," but that it had made no "ideological compromises" in doing so.

At the same time, the Yugoslavs have underscored their own independent position by favorably reporting manifestations of independence by other European communist parties. Thus the Belgrade radio on the 15th reported a statement by PCF General Secretary Marchais to the effect that his party opposed formation of any "center" of the communist movement and would sign the European CP conference final document only if it found it acceptable. These remarks of Marchais were also cited in a

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22 May talk by Zagreb radio commentator Sundic, who has registered virtually the only extensive Yugoslav comment on the European CP conference issue in the recent period. While approving Marchais' remarks, the outspoken Sundic took the French CP daily L'HUMANITE to task for prematurely joining in Western conjectures regarding a possible Yugoslav withdrawal from the conference preparations.

"According to what we know," Sundic remarked, "preparations have not been completed as yet, and thus it is impossible to talk about some kind of Yugoslav withdrawal." Because of the differences in view between the LCY and the other parties, he continued, it could not be predicted whether the planned conference would be successful or unsuccessful or whether it would be held at all, reiterating that the LCY rejects "any binding activity" or institutionalizing of interparty cooperation through the holding of conferences.

The importance of this talk by Sundic was underscored by the fact that it was carried also by the Belgrade radio. In the past, Sundic's commentaries had been aired almost exclusively by the Zagreb radio.

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U S S R

SUSLOV SPEECH SIGNALS TOUGHER POLICY ON ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

A new stage in the vexed relationship between the Soviet leadership and the quasi-independent Academy of Sciences appears to have been reached on 19 May when Politburo member Suslov appeared before the academy to announce the resignation of ailing president M. V. Keldysh and the postponement of the scheduled election of a new presidium until later in the year. Although Suslov was laudatory of Keldysh and formally respectful of the academy--at least in the published version of his remarks, which was clearly abbreviated--his appearance constitutes an unmistakable signal that the leadership intends to tighten its control over the intellectuals. Whether this display of toughness carries broader implications for Soviet foreign policy or leadership politics remains to be seen. The evidence of the past year or two suggests that the regime's policy toward the intellectuals follows its own logic and does not necessarily reflect trends in the broader aspects of Soviet policy.

SUSLOV SPEECH Suslov's appearance before the Academy of Sciences was an unprecedented display of the regime's authority over the academy. Suslov had never addressed the academy before, although as the eminence grise of Soviet ideology, he has acted as the general overseer of science for years. Other Politburo members have occasionally addressed academy sessions, but always on jubilee occasions, and never on matters of internal organization or policy. Podgornyy addressed the academy in April 1970 on Lenin's centennial, and Ponomarev did so in November 1970 on Engels' sesquicentennial and in November 1972 on the 50th anniversary of the USSR.

The originally scheduled purpose of the May meeting of the Academy of Sciences was to elect a new leadership for the academy to replace the presidium elected in May 1971 whose four-year term had expired. Instead, the meeting heard Suslov announce Keldysh's resignation and propose postponing the election until November 1975. There seems little doubt that Keldysh has, indeed, been ill and had requested permission to resign. Suslov stressed that the Central Committee had repeatedly persuaded Keldysh to remain but that this time he flatly refused to begin a new four-year term and "we in the end were forced to . . . consent to his wishes." Suslov's assurances of the leadership's solicitude seem clearly

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intended to avert any suspicion that Keldysh was being purged.* The Soviet leadership does not usually provide detailed explanations for resignations, as witness Shelepin's recent unexplained resignation from the Politburo and trade union council.

On the postponement of the election of a new presidium, Suslov cited the celebration of the 250th anniversary of the academy which was recently rescheduled for October 1975. He pointed out that the present presidium had done so much work on this celebration that it would be "fully justifiable and desirable" for its present membership to carry on until the celebration was completed.

TENSIONS IN THE ACADEMY Suslov's linkage of the postponement to the prior postponement of the 250th anniversary celebration simply substitutes one mystery for another. The celebration of the academy's 250th anniversary had originally been scheduled for May 1974, but had been postponed indefinitely at the last minute for unexplained reasons. In his present speech, Suslov declared that the academy had asked the Central Committee to postpone the ceremony but he omitted to explain why. Only weighty reasons could explain such an action since, as Suslov stressed, the anniversary is a "great event in the country's public life" and an ideal occasion to advertise the achievements of Soviet science.

Circumstances suggest that the anniversary was postponed because of some political conflict within the academy or between the academy and the Central Committee. Though no direct cause can be pinpointed, many members of the academy may have been very upset in May 1974 over attempts by conservative party supervisors to purge respected scholars.** Central Committee science section

* This suspicion was raised in a 27 May report by Baltimore SUN Moscow correspondent Michael Parks, who said that Soviet scientists had told him that Keldysh actually had been forced out for opposing a Central Committee plan to purge some dissident academicians and to end the academy's prized semi-autonomy. According to the scientists, Suslov had bluntly told the academy in his 19 May speech that the Central Committee Secretariat would henceforth appoint academy officials, and this assertion of more direct party control had proved so controversial that the scheduled election of academy leaders had to be postponed.

** See the TRENDS Supplement "Struggle for Change in Soviet Social Sciences," 29 May 1974.

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head S. P. Trapeznikov and Academy of Sciences Vice President P. N. Fedoseyev were conducting a campaign against non-orthodox philosophers, economists, sociologists and historians, including members of the academy's presidium itself, such as economists N. P. Fedorenko and A. M. Rumyantsev. The campaign came to a head in early 1974, notably with the purge of Institute of Philosophy director B. M. Kedrov and USSR History Institute director P. V. Volobuyev shortly before the scheduled anniversary. The anniversary celebration had been planned since August 1973 and the academy's 5 March 1974 annual session gave no hint of any postponement, yet on 6 May 1974 PRAVDA announced that the ceremony was being postponed to an unspecified "later time." Symptomatic of the confusion at the time was the fact that all but two of the republic academies of sciences nevertheless celebrated the USSR academy's anniversary at ceremonies between 23 and 28 May. The Moldavian ceremony was eventually held later, on 22 December, while the Ukraine, which has had its own political problems with its scholars, has yet to hold a ceremony.* Eventually, on 21 March 1975, PRAVDA published a Central Committee decree accepting the academy's proposal to hold the 250th anniversary ceremony in October 1975.

Beyond these issues of relatively recent origin, the regime has long been troubled by the degree of relative autonomy that the Academy of Sciences has been able to assert over the years and the shelter that this has given to dissident intellectuals. For years some academicians have used their privileged status to protect dissidents, and some--like A. D. Sakharov--have even attacked the regime themselves without losing their academicians' status and pay. When the regime began its big campaign against Sakharov in August 1973, many leading academicians failed to sign the academy's collective letter condemning Sakharov. More subtle and widespread forms of resistance have often appeared in the election of new Academy of Sciences members. In these secret ballots, academicians have repeatedly rejected the bids of some of their party overseers to join the academy. The unpopular Trapeznikov ran unsuccessfully for corresponding member of the academy in 1966, but appeared to have then given up and was not even a candidate in 1970, 1972 and 1974. Trapeznikov's subordinate, head of the Central Committee's philosophy sector N. V. Pilipenko, as well as first deputy Agitprop chief G. L. Smirnov and new Institute of Philosophy director B. S. Ukraintsev were rejected in last November's academy election.

* For background on these issues, see the FBIS TRENDS for 3 July 1974, pages 12-16, and 12 June 1974, pages 31-35.

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NOTES

HUSAK ASSUMPTION OF PRESIDENCY: The 27 May CPCZ Central Committee plenum resolution which recommended that party General Secretary Gustav Husak succeed the ailing Svoboda as president went out of its way to answer the question of why one man should hold both posts. It said that, having assessed the experience of past years, the party came to the conclusion that whether the two posts "are to be held by one or two persons is always dependent on the concrete situation and the assessment of all the optimum requirements" of further socialist development, adding that Husak's presidential candidacy corresponds with the concrete conditions "at the present stage." In Eastern Europe, only Bulgaria's Zhivkov, Romania's Ceausescu, and Yugoslavia's Tito hold both the offices of party leader and president. The list of speakers seconding Premier Strougal's nomination of Husak as president at the plenum did not include Husak's hardline rival for the party leadership, CPCZ Presidium member and secretary Vasil Bilak. Following Husak's formal election to the presidency by the Federal Assembly on the 29th, he was promptly congratulated by Brezhnev and Podgornyy in a message which praised him as "an outstanding party and state leader of socialist Czechoslovakia" who had gained the well deserved respect of the world communist movement.

PRC PROVINCIAL LEADERSHIP: A 28 May Hupeh broadcast identified Chao Hsin-chu as Hupeh provincial party first secretary and revolutionary committee chairman. The posts have been vacant since December 1973, when former provincial chief Tseng Szu-yu was sent to Shantung during the mass transfer of all military region commanders who were also provincial party chiefs. Chao has been a party secretary and revolutionary committee vice chairman in Hupeh since mid-1973. Prior to the cultural revolution he was a party secretary there from 1956 to 1965. He moved briefly to Peking in 1965 as a vice minister of culture, but dropped out of sight during the cultural revolution. He was elected an alternate member of the central committee in August 1973 and was a member of the NPC presidium this past January. The revelation of Chao's position as provincial first secretary is the fifth such since December; all of the first secretaries have been civilians who held high provincial posts prior to the cultural revolution. Of those provinces in which new military commanders were named during the 1973 shifts, only Liaoning apparently still has a first secretary vacancy. Politburo member Li Te-sheng, based in Liaoning as military commander, was dropped as a party vice chairman in

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January and his troubles may have delayed the naming of a first secretary there. Another first secretary vacancy is in Anhwei, where Li was the last chief, and there are apparent vacancies in Heilungkiang and Shansi, where the former first secretaries ran into political difficulties and have made no provincial appearances in over a year. There are probably other vacancies as well, since a number of provincial first secretaries have long been assigned to duties in Peking and may have given up their provincial posts.

CUBA ON MAYAGUEZ: A 23 May Cuban Foreign Ministry statement denouncing the "brutal U.S. military aggression" in recovering the ship Mayaguez from Cambodia accords with past Cuban positions on U.S. involvement in Indochina and Cuba's long-standing policy of verbal support for Indochinese liberation movements. The statement on the Mayaguez incident predictably gives no hint of any moderation in the Cuban view of U.S. Indochina policy despite recent, scattered conciliatory remarks by Fidel Castro on the conditions for reestablishing U.S.-Cuban relations. The statement was the second on Indochinese events issued recently by the Cuban Foreign Ministry, which normally issues only two or three statements a year on various topics. A 3 April statement on Vietnam, reprinted in GRAMMA WEEKLY REVIEW on 13 April, had hailed the "resounding victories" over "Yankee imperialism" and the "bloodthirsty dictatorship" of Thieu. The foreign ministry statement on the Mayaguez incident blasted the "brutal U.S. military aggression" which followed the "legitimate seizure" of the ship, which it described as entering Cambodia's territorial waters "with provocative purposes and deliberate contempt of its sovereignty." The statement, broadcast by Havana domestic service on 23 May, noted that the Mayaguez events came in the wake of the United States' "crushing defeat" in Cambodia and South Vietnam and once again demonstrated the "criminal nature" of this country's "unalterable interventionist and hostile policy" toward the Indochinese and "other peace-loving people."

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 19 - 25 MAY 1975

<u>Moscow (2870 items)</u>			<u>Peking (878 items)</u>		
Gromyko-Kissinger	(--)	8%	Cambodia	(9%)	11%
Talks in Vienna			[Mayaguez Incident	(5%)	4%]
[Joint Communique	(--)	3%]	[Sihanouk in DPRK	(--)	3%]
China	(7%)	8%	Teng Hsiao-Ping in	(16%)	5%
African Liberation Day	(--)	5%	France		
Upcoming Union Republic	(7%)	5%	Indonesian CP 55th Anni-	(--)	5%
Supreme Soviet Elections			versary		
Vietnam	(5%)	4%	Vietnam	(9%)	3%
V-E Day 30th Anniversary	(14%)	3%	CCP CC Condolences on	(--)	3%
			Death of Burma CP		
			Officials		
			Party/Government Bulletins	(--)	3%
			on Tung Pi-Wu Death		
			Iran Princess Ashraf in	(--)	3%
			PRC		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.